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In the perspective of a study of emotions and mind in adaptive and naturalized terms, 
the analysis of empathic phenomena assumes a peculiar significance. Putting together 
neuroscience and philosophy, nowadays it is possible to analyze the neurobiological 
substrate of empathy and to conceptually redefine empathy. We will talk about some 
philosophical reflections on empathy and then we will stress that, as in some philosophical 
theories, recent brain imaging studies reveal the existence of multiple areas (and so, multiple 
levels) involved in empathic responses: limbic areas for the emotional resonance; motor 
areas and sensory areas for sensorimotor resonance; prefrontal areas to assess the social 
status of others, and parietal areas to adopt the others intentional point of view and for the 
self/other distinction. A detailed analysis of empirical data has led us to show how the same 
‘mirroring’ metaphor is used for two different phenomena. However, it is possible to throw a 
bridge between the different types of empathic responses  (motor or emotional ones).  Then, 
we will focus on some theoretical points to provide a contribution about empathy, a topic 
that often is still considered an enigma for sciences of mind and behavior.
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The analysis of empathic phenomena assumes a great significance for the 
study of emotions and mind in adaptive and thus naturalized terms. This 
subject has been the center of a long philosophical debate. Recently empathy 
studies crossed the borders of philosophical research to become a subject of 
experimental investigation. In particular empirical evidence from psychology 
and neuroscience was achieved in the theory of motor resonance and in the 
perception-action model. We are convinced that it is of great heuristic value 
to approach this subject both by neuroscience research and philosophical 
theories, because in this way it becomes possible to analyze and interpret the 
neurobiological substrate of the empathic phenomenon and to conceptually 
redefine empathy.
Therefore, we will focus on the possible interaction between a 
phenomenological perspective and the progresses of neuroscience as also 
Gallagher and Zahavi proposed in their The Phenomenological Mind (2008). 
Within this framework we will both try to interpret some neuroscientific 
evidence in the light of the phenomenological theories and to modify the 
theories about empathic mechanisms using the results achieved by cognitive 
neuroscience.
Theodor Lipps (1903) claims that empathy is a fundamental concept in the 
theory of aesthetics, and he defines it as a process through which we relive 
ourselves within the observed object. Moreover, Lipps affirms that when we 
put ourselves in the other’s shoes, for example when we observe a tightrope 
walker moving on the wire, we are able to understand his/her intentions and 
emotions. This understanding is relieved through our bodies and our feelings.
Max Scheler (1923) describes the differences between the various ways of 
“feel with others” (Mitgefühl). He distinguishes both “sympathy”, namely the 
sharing of feelings, the emotional contagion, and “unipathy” (Einsfühlung) 
namely the identification with the other, from “empathy” (Einfühlung), which 
is defined as feeling the other’s feelings. According to Scheler the self/other 
distinction seems to be one of the basic characteristics that distinguishes 
empathy from other forms of “feel with the other”. 
Edmund Husserl (1931, 1952) suggests that, by nature, we are 
intersubjectively open to others. According to him, the intersubjective 
experience should be conceived as an empathic experience in which we 
consciously ascribe to the other intentional acts and feelings, putting 
in its clothes. The opening of subjectivity is made possible because of 
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physical, sensorial and perceptual similarities with the other seen as Leib 
(Husserl distinguishes between Körper , the physical structure, and Leib, the 
component that is experientially based in our living body). The first step 
to take the point of view of others is a passive one and it is followed by the 
voluntary (intentional) act of imaginative thinking. For an accurate analysis, 
see Petit (2004 and also 1999).
The disciple of Husserl, Edith Stein (1917), focuses on the act of “fusion” of 
different points of view needed in empathy, but pointed out that, to really 
understand the other, it is crucial to maintain a self/other distinction: 
empathy presupposes alterity. Stein describes empathy as a way to access 
the other in its wholeness; it represents the condition of possibility of all the 
feelings and the many forms of understanding others. It is also interesting to 
note that the alterity becomes, according to Stein and Scheler, a constitutive 
element of the empathic feeling. [On this topic, see Gallagher and Zahavi 
(2009, p. 284) when they say that it is not an imperfection: the difference 
between the access in the first person to the own experience and the access 
to the experience of the other is constitutive].
Leaving aside for a moment the theoretical argument concerning the theory 
of mind and theory of simulation as different explanations of empathy (see, 
also in this case, Gallagher and Zahavi 2009), we want to summarize some of 
the principal recent studies of brain imaging on empathy. It is important to 
underline that those studies reveal the existence of multiple areas involved in 
the empathic response:
• limbic areas (the anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior insula, 
Singer et al. 2004; de Vignemont and Singer 2006, Carr et al. 2003) for the 
emotional resonance;
• motor areas (premotor cortex and, in general, the mirror neurons’ 
circuit, Di Pellegrino et al. 1992; Rizzolatti and colleagues in the last 
twenty years, Wicker et al. 2003) and sensory areas (somatosensory 
cortex; Bufalari et al. 2007; Avenanti et al. 2005) for sensorimotor 
resonance (e.g. especially the supporters of the perception-action 
model, Preston and de Waal 2002, and the motor theory of empathy, 
Leslie et al. 2004, Carr et al. 2003, Meltzoff and Decety 2003).
• prefrontal areas (ventromedial prefrontal cortex, Damasio 2003) 
involved in assessing the social status of others, and parietal areas, 
active in adopting the intentional point of view of others (Decety 2004) 
and for the self/other distinction (Bachoud-Levi and Degos 2004). 
A detailed analysis of empirical data provided to date by neuroimaging has led 
to show how the same metaphor that of mirroring is used for two different 
phenomena that involve the activation of different neural networks: the one a 
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motor network, the other an emotional network (Galloni 2009). However, the 
results of Avenanti and colleagues (2005, Bufalari et al. 2007) indicate that in 
the mechanism for empathic pain there is the activation of motor components 
but also fine-grained somatic responses. Avenanti and colleagues, both using 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (Avenanti et al. 2005) and somatosensory-
evoked potentials (Bufalari et al. 2007), found that motor components and also 
fine-grained somatic responses (also in the primary somatosensory cortex) 
are involved in the empathic mechanism for pain. They suggest the existence 
“of a pain resonance system that extracts basic sensory aspects of the model’s 
painful experience […] and maps them onto the observer’s motor system 
according to topographic rules” (Avenanti et al. 2005, p. 958). Therefore, it 
seems that both the affective and the sensorimotor areas of the so-called “pain 
matrix” (a neural network crucially involved in pain experience, Melzack 1999) 
are activated in an automatic and unconscious way in empathic response. This 
mechanism, which they named “sensorimotor” or “somatomotor contagion”, 
seems to throw a bridge between the two types of empathy – motor and 
emotional – mentioned above.
Therefore we tried to attempt a contribution towards the explanation of the 
empathic feeling, with a neurophilosophical formulation of the different 
levels of empathic-like and empathic-based mechanisms, starting from low-
levels (see Galloni 2009). We can now briefly analyse this stratified approach. 
At the lower level, following the formulations of Preston and de Waal, we 
talk about the emotional contagion, which consists of a total and immediate 
identification with the feelings of the other and that is an unconscious 
and automatic phenomenon, and it provides an identity of emotional 
state between perceiving and perceived subject, without any inhibition 
in the repetition of emotional matching (think about the crying of babies 
in a nursery). The sensorimotor-emotional resonance, similar to Scheler’s 
unipathy, differs from the emotional contagion because the state is not 
duplicated but only simulated; it is a phenomenon that is based on mirror 
mechanisms and a network that implies limbic areas, premotor but also 
sensory areas that communicate using both anatomical pathways, such as the 
field of dysgranular insula (e.g. Carr et al. 2003, p. 5497), and functional ones, 
such as the hypothesis of gamma-band frequencies (Lutz et al. 2004). Then 
there is the genuine empathy, which requires, in addition to what listed in 
previous levels, the intentional self/other distinction, made possible by the 
involvement of proprioceptive information (Decety 2004, see also Gallagher 
and Zahavi, when they speak in relation to the sense of agency, p. 252) and 
parietal areas (Bachoud-Levi and Degos 2004).
At a further step, we place what is called social empathy, or the pragmatic 
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application of empathy, our inclination to relieve the suffering of others. It is 
probably made possible by the contribution of the ventromedial prefrontal 
areas mentioned by Damasio (2003); it requires the self/other distinction but 
state matching is not necessary. We are not saying that it is an explanation 
for the ethical domain, but it may be a precondition of it (e.g. de Waal and 
Thompson 2005, p. 49). Finally, there is cognitive empathy, or perspective-
taking, which is a representation of the mental and emotional states of others 
in which the perceiver is not identified, he doesn’t “resonate” with the other. 
Classically it can be considered as the main level on which the supporters of 
the theory of mind operate. 
Therefore, empathy is only a level among all the resonance phenomena, and 
it is a conscious bodily experience of other’s feelings.
Now, going on to observe the way in which Gallagher and Zahavi addressed 
this issue in their text The Phenomenological Mind, we cannot but agree 
with the fact that phenomenology has much to say about the explanation 
of social cognition, intersubjectivity. We have seen that adopting some 
phenomenological theories we have been able to interpret more deeply 
the latest neuroscientific results, especially to articulate the mirroring 
phenomenon in different levels.  
The reading makes clear, however, some thoughts and clarifications to do, 
that we would like to briefly set out. First, we have to notice that often, when 
we talk about the neurobiological basis of the resonance, mirror neurons are 
mentioned (Gallagher and Zahavi 2009, p. 269). This is not entirely correct 
because, as we saw in the previous discussion, in the case of empathy there 
is not properly an activation of mirror neurons. It is not therefore the 
neural premotor area but the functional mechanism (a direct “resonance” 
mechanism) discovered through mirror neurons that is really interesting for 
an explanation of empathy.
Furthermore, trying to understand what constitutes the phenomenon of the 
simulation, Gallagher and Zahavi discuss quite correctly that it is part of an 
intersubjective perception (p. 272), but a little later they state that we are not 
active during the social experience of other’s feeling or intentions, the other 
is doing something to us (p. 274). So while it is correct that this is a perceptual 
event, we are not in agreement with the fact that the interpretation of the 
authors seems to assume the idea that the perceiving subject is a passive one 
in relation to that event. Both from a theoretical and experimental point of 
view, the idea of a passive perception now seems meaningless, and in other 
points of the discussion the authors show to be totally convinced of that, 
stating, for example, that we perceive in a pragmatic way (p. 152). Another 
point we would like to raise is in relation to the existence of various levels of 
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intersubjective understanding. As we have seen, it is our belief that empathy 
is indeed one of the possible ways in which we understand what the other 
feels, an intermediate level among the different constructs we have listed. 
Gallagher and Zahavi say that this account is problematic if you intend to take 
a phenomenological point of view, since it is likely to distinguish a perceptual 
stage and a cognitive one. So we would clarify that when we speak about a 
“level” what we mean is a slightly different phenomenon in which there is 
something (as a specific neural activity) that is not added later than usual on 
the lower level, but there is something that is added or subtracted during that 
specific phenomenon (for example, think about empathy, that – in addition 
to the mechanisms involved in the previous levels – requires the self/other 
intentional distinction). The act of understanding is a joint act, because our 
cognitive system is integrated, and because – as previously stated – the very 
act of seeing the expressive movement of others leads us to understand its 
meaning, without any inference.
In conclusion, we hope that such an approach, that aims to connect more 
and more the philosophy of mind in general and phenomenology in 
particular to the cognitive sciences, will be increasingly followed and that the 
communication between these disciplines will be highly fertile. Still today in 
experimental sciences it is difficult for researchers to understand what might 
be the true and proper role of the phenomenological point of view, and the 
text of Gallagher and Zahavi is certainly useful in this direction. On the other 
hand, philosophers often are unfamiliar with the experimental literature, and 
often they use the same data just in a descriptive way, not arriving to a true 
interpretation of a class of experimental data and neurological disorders. We 
are trying to cross this bridge. We firmly believe it is indeed the only way to 
get a deeper understanding of cognitive functions. 
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